Latest Judicial Cases:-
1. Jainendra Singh Vs. State
of U.P. Tr. Prinl. Section Home and Ors. - Jul 30 2012 (Supreme Court)
Issue
Indian Penal Code - Sections 34, 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 324, 325, 326, 336,
380, 427, 506, 596
Synopsis
The main issue was whether the services of a Constable in the Police Department
be terminated who concealed certain relevant facts which he was called upon to
disclose after his selection was finalized and after order of appointment was
issued by placing him on probation. It was found that the Appellant was
involved in a criminal case for an offence falling under Sections 147, 323,
336, Indian Penal Code which was pending in the Court at the time of his
selection though subsequently he was acquitted by the competent Court. Since
the Appellant concealed his involvement in a criminal case, the Senior
Superintendent of Police passed orders terminating his appointment/ services on
that ground. Aggrieved by the said termination order, the Appellant approached
the High Court by filing a Writ Petition and by the challenged order the High
Court declined to interfere with the order of termination holding that the
Appellant consciously concealed the important information in order to secure
employment and subsequent acquittal. It was laid down as a preposition of law
that suppression of material information which a candidate was called upon to
furnish and which he failed to do, such concealment would result in serious
consequences. It was also not appropriate to the nature of service for which
such recruitment was made and the State would be well within its powers to
resort to cancellation of such appointment when the appointee was under-going
probation in order to ensure cleanliness in the service. It was held that when
a criminal case under Sections 148/ 323/ 380/ 427/ 596, Indian Penal Code was
filed against the Respondent and it was pending in the Court, it would not be
appropriate to appoint the Respondent as a constable. Surely, the authorities
entrusted with the responsibility of appointing constables were under duty to
verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he was suitable for
the post of constable and so long as the candidate had not been acquitted in
the criminal case of the charges under Sections 148/ 323/ 380 / 427/ 596 IPC,
he could not possibly be held to be suitable for appointment to the post of
constable.
It was held that it was appropriate
to refer the above mentioned issue to a larger Bench of this Court for an
authoritative pronouncement so that there would be no conflict of views and
which would enable the Courts to apply the law uniformly while dealing with
such issues.
Registry was directed to place all
the relevant documents before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of
a larger Bench.
2. Jayanti Kumari Nayak Vs.
State of Orissa and Ors. - Jul 31 2012 (Supreme Court)
Issue
Service Law
Synopsis
The Respondent made an allegation that despite due selection he was not allowed
to work and appellant was put in his place. An appeal was made before the
Director and it was decided by an ex-parte order that Respondent be allowed to
work. A Writ petition was filed by the Governing Body. The argument raised by
the Governing Body was that intimation regarding date of hearing was received a
day after the hearing. The Court however found it to be false as Telegram was
sent for giving notice of hearing. Thus, the Writ was dismissed with liberty to
Governing body to file an application before Director for review. Respondent
No. 4 challenged the order of the Director before the High Court in Writ
Petition. The High Court allowed the writ petition. The High Court noticed the
earlier proceedings between the parties and further that in the previous writ
petition filed by the Governing Body of the College, the Court had left it open
to the Governing Body to file an application before the Director for review of
his earlier order. It was held that the Director had no power to review and its
earlier order had become final and it could not be changed by him on the basis
of a petition for recall of that order. The High Court pronounced that the
order of the Director was final. It, accordingly, allowed the writ petition.
Against the order of the High Court the Appellant filed an appeal to this
Court. It was held that in the first round High Court gave liberty to Governing
body to file a petition for review however in the second round it held Director
to be having no power of review. Thus, matter was not properly dealt with and
was postponed to Director for fresh consideration. All previous orders were set
aside. Different proceedings arising from earlier orders, pending before courts
were also abated. The appeal was disposed of by the Director by an ex parte
order holding that the action of the General Body in prohibiting the applicant
(respondent No.4 in the present appeal) from discharging his duties was illegal
and requested the Secretary of the Governing Body to allow respondent No.4 to
perform his duties as a lecturer in the college. It was held that the matter
was not properly dealt with and at the same time there were materials to
suggest that respondent No.4 was able to obtain the ex parte order from the
Director on the basis of a document, the genuineness of which was doubtful.
Thus all the previous orders passed
both by the High Court and the Director were set aside and remit the case to
the Director to consider the matter afresh after hearing respondent No.4, the
Governing Body of the College and the appellant and pass a fresh order on his
appeal in accordance with law.
3. The Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd. Vs. Siby George and Ors. - Jul 31 2012 (Supreme Court)
Issue
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Sections 3, 3(1), 3(5), 4, 4(2), 4(3), 4A,
4A(1), 4A(2), 4A(3), 19
Synopsis
The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Ernakulam directed for payment of
simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the accident. The
Appellant's appeal was dismissed by the Kerala High Court as barred by
limitation. Against the order of the High Court the Appellant filed the special
leave petition in which notice was issued "limited to the interest".
The main issues in this matter was when did the payment of compensation under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 become due and accordingly what was the
point in time from which interest would be payable on the amount of
compensation as provided under Section 4A(3) of the Act. It was stated that
Sub-section (3) of Section 4A was in two parts, separately dealing with
interest and penalty in Clauses (a) and (b) respectively. Clause (a) provided
the levy of interest, with no option, in case of default in payment of
compensation, without going into the question regarding the reasons for the
default. Clause (b) provided for imposition of penalty in case, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, there was no justification for the delay. Before imposing
penalty, however, the Commissioner was required to give the employer a
reasonable opportunity to show cause. As per Sub-section (3) it was clear that
payment of interest was a result of default in payment without going into the
reasons for the delay and it was only in case where the delay was without
justification, the employer might also be held liable to penalty after giving
him a show cause. Therefore, the delay in payment of the amount due was
unjustified was required to be recorded only in case of imposition of penalty
and no such finding was required in case of interest which was to be levied on
default per se. Section 3 of the Act dealt with the employer's liability for
compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provided that the employer was
liable to pay compensation if "personal injury was caused to a workman by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." It was held
in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata that an employer was liable to
pay compensation as soon as the personal injury was caused to the workmen by
the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the
relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation was the date of the
accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
Thus, it was not open
to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the
Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim
application was made. The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs amounting
to Rs. 20,000/-. The amount of cost was to be paid to the Respondents within
six weeks.
4. Satpal Vs. Union of India
- Aug 1 2012 (Delhi High Court)
Issue
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 32; Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965
Synopsis
It was pleaded by the Petitioner in the writ petition that he was served with a
charge sheet alleging that while functioning as a driver of vehicle he
misappropriated Government Stores like cement, diesel and explosives and sold
the same in the village and thereby failed to maintain integrity. As per the
statement of imputation to the charge sheet, it was alleged that aforesaid fact
surfaced at a Court of Inquiry were recovered from the Superintendent. The
petitioner also pleaded that the inquiry was initiated under the CCS (CCA)
Rules 1965 on the findings by a Court of Inquiry under the Army Act. The
principal three counts on which the penalty levied upon the petitioner i.e. of
dismissal from service were: Firstly, that the department could either proceed
against the petitioner as per the Army Act or before a Civil Forum and having
chosen to proceed under the Army Act, the respondents could not opt to proceed
at a Civil Forum. The second contention urged was that statement of Bhola Nath
Tiwari during Court of Inquiry proceedings could not be relied at the
departmental inquiry. Thirdly, that a person could not be subjected to dual
jurisdiction. It was held that as long as there was procedural fairness at a
domestic inquiry and as long as a witness was cross-examined, statements made
by such a witness would be admissible in evidence, being relevant to the
inquiry. It was stated that where statement made by a person implying the other
was made in the presence of he who was inculpated and said inculpated person
was granted an opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement, be it
at a preliminary inquiry or a proceeding akin to a Court of Inquiry, such
statements would be admissible in evidence at a domestic enquiry for the
reason, the person inculpated had been granted a fair opportunity to test the
veracity of the statement made by cross-examining the maker of the statement.
On the subject of petitioner being proved to be guilty of misappropriating
government property i.e. cement bags and selling the same and pocketing the ill
gotten gains, the testimony of Bhola Nath Tiwari at the Court of Inquiry
proceedings nailed the petitioner. The petitioner cross-examined Bhola Nath and
could not destroy his credibility. On the subject of the penalty imposed, it
was stated that he who steals government property or misappropriates the same,
and was a government servant, must suffer the consequences and the penalty of
dismissal from service would be the appropriate penalty.
Thus, there was no
merit in the petition and therefore it was dismissed.
Source:
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Prakash Verma
E Id:- Prkverma@gmail.com
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