Latest Case - Supreme Court
of India
Cox & Kings Ltd. Vs. Indian Rly. Catering & Tourism
Corporation Ltd.& Anr., (With Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos.41-43 of 2012
In Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.965-967 of 2012) - Jul 5 2012
Issue
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 9
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 9
Synopsis
The Ministry of Railways sanctioned the proposal submitted by the Indian Railway Catering & Tourism Corporation Ltd. for operating a Luxury Tourist Train on a Pan- India route within India. The Petitioner was selected as the Joint Venture shareholder for the operation of the Luxury Tourist Train Project. The proposal was approved based on certain principles for running the said train which was set out by the Indian Railways. During the operation of the Joint Venture certain disputes arose between the shareholders regarding the working of the Joint Venture Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding, which led to the termination of the lease arrangement by the Respondent, IRCTC. The Petitioner initiated a proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, under the Arbitration Clause contained in Article 30 of the Joint Venture Agreement, for staying the termination of the lease agreement and also to allow the arrangements to continue. It was pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court, that the Petitioner was not entitled to question the termination as by itself it had no existence as far as the running of the train was concerned and it was not a party to the proceedings. In fact, the Petitioner had attempted to either fix the Lease Agreement, which was terminated, or to create a fresh Agreement to enable the Petitioner to run the luxury train till a decision was arrived at in Clause 9 of the Application. Though the Petitioner had invested large sums of money in the project, it was not entitled to pray for and obtain a compulsory order of injunction to operate the train once the lease agreement was terminated. The Division Bench rejected the submission that the Joint Venture Agreement was similar to a partnership. The Division Bench of the High Court stated that the Petitioner’s remedy would lie in an action for damages against IRCTC for breach of any of the terms and conditions of the Joint Venture Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding. It was held that parties should appoint an Arbitral Tribunal to settle their disputes regarding the operation of the train by IRCTC. The Special Leave Petitions was therefore dismissed and it was also stated that if an Arbitral Tribunal is appointed, the aforesaid arrangement would be subject to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal and that the observations made by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench of the High Court and this court, should not, in any way, influence the outcome of the arbitral proceedings, if resorted to by the parties.
The Ministry of Railways sanctioned the proposal submitted by the Indian Railway Catering & Tourism Corporation Ltd. for operating a Luxury Tourist Train on a Pan- India route within India. The Petitioner was selected as the Joint Venture shareholder for the operation of the Luxury Tourist Train Project. The proposal was approved based on certain principles for running the said train which was set out by the Indian Railways. During the operation of the Joint Venture certain disputes arose between the shareholders regarding the working of the Joint Venture Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding, which led to the termination of the lease arrangement by the Respondent, IRCTC. The Petitioner initiated a proceeding under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, under the Arbitration Clause contained in Article 30 of the Joint Venture Agreement, for staying the termination of the lease agreement and also to allow the arrangements to continue. It was pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court, that the Petitioner was not entitled to question the termination as by itself it had no existence as far as the running of the train was concerned and it was not a party to the proceedings. In fact, the Petitioner had attempted to either fix the Lease Agreement, which was terminated, or to create a fresh Agreement to enable the Petitioner to run the luxury train till a decision was arrived at in Clause 9 of the Application. Though the Petitioner had invested large sums of money in the project, it was not entitled to pray for and obtain a compulsory order of injunction to operate the train once the lease agreement was terminated. The Division Bench rejected the submission that the Joint Venture Agreement was similar to a partnership. The Division Bench of the High Court stated that the Petitioner’s remedy would lie in an action for damages against IRCTC for breach of any of the terms and conditions of the Joint Venture Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding. It was held that parties should appoint an Arbitral Tribunal to settle their disputes regarding the operation of the train by IRCTC. The Special Leave Petitions was therefore dismissed and it was also stated that if an Arbitral Tribunal is appointed, the aforesaid arrangement would be subject to the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal and that the observations made by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench of the High Court and this court, should not, in any way, influence the outcome of the arbitral proceedings, if resorted to by the parties.
Vishwanath S/o Sitaram
Agrawal Vs. Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal - Jul 4 2012
Issue
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity ''the Act'') - Section 13(1) (ia); Code of Civil Procedure - Section 100; Indian Penal Code - Sections 494, 498A
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity ''the Act'') - Section 13(1) (ia); Code of Civil Procedure - Section 100; Indian Penal Code - Sections 494, 498A
Synopsis
The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized as per the Hindu rites but due to total disagreement in their marital life the appellant-husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The main issues involved in this matter were whether the appellant was able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application and also dismissed the application of the respondent-wife for grant of permanent alimony. The appellant-husband preferred Civil Appeal which was again dismissed. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal before the High Court. It was stated that the expression ''cruelty'' had an inseparable link with human conduct or human behaviour. It was always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that had been conditioned by their social status. The conduct and circumstances made it clear that the respondent-wife had really humiliated him and caused mental cruelty. Her conduct clearly showed that it had resulted in causing agony and anguish in the mind of the husband. She had publicized in the newspapers that he was a womanizer and a drunkard. She had made false allegations about his character. She had made an effort to prosecute him in criminal litigations which she had failed to prove. The feeling of deep torture, disappointment and frustration of the husband was apparent. Thus, it was held that husband could not be asked to put up with the conduct of the wife and to continue to live with her. Therefore, he was entitled to a decree for divorce. The other issue was the grant of permanent alimony. Permanent alimony was to be granted taking into consideration the social status, the conduct of the parties, the way of living of the spouse and such other adjunct prospects. The amount that was already paid to the respondent- wife towards alimony was to be ignored as the same had been paid by virtue of the interim orders passed by the courts. It was not expected that the respondent-wife had sustained herself without spending the said money. Cases referred to were: i.) Sirajmohamedkhan Janmohamadkhan vs. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan and another, (1981) 4 SCC 250, ii.) Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi, 1988 (1) SCC 105. The appeal was allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside. Consequently, a decree for divorce in favor of the appellant was granted and the wife was granted Rs.50 lacs towards permanent alimony.
The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized as per the Hindu rites but due to total disagreement in their marital life the appellant-husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The main issues involved in this matter were whether the appellant was able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The learned trial Judge dismissed the application and also dismissed the application of the respondent-wife for grant of permanent alimony. The appellant-husband preferred Civil Appeal which was again dismissed. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal before the High Court. It was stated that the expression ''cruelty'' had an inseparable link with human conduct or human behaviour. It was always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that had been conditioned by their social status. The conduct and circumstances made it clear that the respondent-wife had really humiliated him and caused mental cruelty. Her conduct clearly showed that it had resulted in causing agony and anguish in the mind of the husband. She had publicized in the newspapers that he was a womanizer and a drunkard. She had made false allegations about his character. She had made an effort to prosecute him in criminal litigations which she had failed to prove. The feeling of deep torture, disappointment and frustration of the husband was apparent. Thus, it was held that husband could not be asked to put up with the conduct of the wife and to continue to live with her. Therefore, he was entitled to a decree for divorce. The other issue was the grant of permanent alimony. Permanent alimony was to be granted taking into consideration the social status, the conduct of the parties, the way of living of the spouse and such other adjunct prospects. The amount that was already paid to the respondent- wife towards alimony was to be ignored as the same had been paid by virtue of the interim orders passed by the courts. It was not expected that the respondent-wife had sustained herself without spending the said money. Cases referred to were: i.) Sirajmohamedkhan Janmohamadkhan vs. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan and another, (1981) 4 SCC 250, ii.) Shobha Rani vs. Madhukar Reddi, 1988 (1) SCC 105. The appeal was allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside. Consequently, a decree for divorce in favor of the appellant was granted and the wife was granted Rs.50 lacs towards permanent alimony.
Medical Council of India Vs. Rama Medical College Hospital &
Research Centre, Kanpur & Anr., (With Civil Appeal No.4909 of 2012,
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.30332 of 2011) and Civil Appeal No.4910 of 2012,
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.30338 of 2011) and Civil Appeal No.4912 of 2012,
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.3732 of 2012) and Writ Petition (Civil) Nos.457, 458
And 489 of 2011) - Jul 4 2012
Issue
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 - Sections 10(A), 10(B), 11, 33; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 3
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 - Sections 10(A), 10(B), 11, 33; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1, 2 and 3
Synopsis
The question which arose before the Single Judge of the Court was whether Regulation 3(1) in Part II of 'The Opening of a New or Higher Course of Study or Training and Increase of admission capacity in any course of study or training Regulations, 2000 barred a college/institution running Bachelor of Medicine or Bachelor of Surgery course, to seek increase of seats till recognition was obtained by institution or college as per the requirement of Sub-section 1 of the Section 11 of the Indian Medical Council Act 1956. The Single Judge answered the same in favor of the writ petitioners and therefore appeals were filed. Section 10A laid down the criteria for grant of permission for establishment of a new medical college and that Section 10B supplemented the same by making it clear that even while increasing the number of seats in a medical college or institution, the procedure indicated in Section 10A, and in particular Section 10A(2), had to be followed. At every stage, it was the Council which played a very important role in either the grant of permission to establish a new medical college or to increase the number of seats. Therefore, the judgments passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, and the directions to increase the number of seats from 100 to 150 in the MBBS course were set aside, but it was made clear that this would not prevent the medical colleges/institutions from applying for increase in the number of students, provided such application fulfilled the conditions and criteria of Section 10A and the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India. Cases referred to were: i.) Medical Council of India vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1998) 6 SCC 131], ii.) State of M.P. Vs. Nivedita Jain [(1981) 4 SCC 296]. While setting aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Consequently, the appeals preferred by the Medical Council of India were allowed.
The question which arose before the Single Judge of the Court was whether Regulation 3(1) in Part II of 'The Opening of a New or Higher Course of Study or Training and Increase of admission capacity in any course of study or training Regulations, 2000 barred a college/institution running Bachelor of Medicine or Bachelor of Surgery course, to seek increase of seats till recognition was obtained by institution or college as per the requirement of Sub-section 1 of the Section 11 of the Indian Medical Council Act 1956. The Single Judge answered the same in favor of the writ petitioners and therefore appeals were filed. Section 10A laid down the criteria for grant of permission for establishment of a new medical college and that Section 10B supplemented the same by making it clear that even while increasing the number of seats in a medical college or institution, the procedure indicated in Section 10A, and in particular Section 10A(2), had to be followed. At every stage, it was the Council which played a very important role in either the grant of permission to establish a new medical college or to increase the number of seats. Therefore, the judgments passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, and the directions to increase the number of seats from 100 to 150 in the MBBS course were set aside, but it was made clear that this would not prevent the medical colleges/institutions from applying for increase in the number of students, provided such application fulfilled the conditions and criteria of Section 10A and the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India. Cases referred to were: i.) Medical Council of India vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1998) 6 SCC 131], ii.) State of M.P. Vs. Nivedita Jain [(1981) 4 SCC 296]. While setting aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Consequently, the appeals preferred by the Medical Council of India were allowed.
Regards
Prakash Verma
Contact E-Id: prkverma@yahoo.com
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